Yep, another thesis paper.


In January of 1964 violent riots broke out in the canal zone of Panama killing 4 American soldiers and twenty Panamanians. At the heart of the incident was growing anger over the United State’s unilateral control over a piece of territory in the middle of Panama. It began an effort by leaders of both countries to renegotiate the operation of the canal. However because of overwhelming support of the status quo in the U.S. a new treaty still had not been reached by the time Jimmy Carter took office in 1977. Early on President Carter made the implementation of a new agreement his top priority and the commitment he showed in the face of overwhelming opposition could only be described as a personal crusade. The issue caused a fervent debate among the Senate and House and made for a major challenge to Carter’s administration. Opponents to a new treaty rallied to their cause and attempted to block it by speaking against it to the public, voting against it or adding amendments deliberately aimed at causing Panama to reject the finalized treaty. Carter faced a large majority of the public who opposed handing over control to Panama. He also faced a serious threat an attack on the canal by angry Panamanians or a dissolution of the friendly government there. Many have pointed to Carter’s defeat in the presidential election of 1980 as proof that the American public didn’t approve of his decision to push for a new treaty. So the question that arises, and one that is still under debate among Americans, is whether Carter was right in pursuing a change in the status quo regarding the Canal. Opponents claim that Carter gave away one of the countries most valuable assets, that he played into the hands of communist efforts in Latin American in doing so, and that he did so because of Panamanian “blackmail.” However it is clear that these arguments are not reasonable. The new treaties strengthened American prestige abroad, actually curbed the influence of leftist subversives in Panama, and guaranteed access to the canal for American ships in perpetuity. Carter had not simply come into office with a desire to get rid of a good situation. He was faced with a crisis in Panama that could only be solved by a transfer of ownership of the canal to the Panamanians.

In his presidential memoirs Carter says that “before 1974 [he] was only vaguely aware of any argument about [the canal] in the United States.” He goes on to elaborate in his memoirs that he came to focus on the issue as a result of a large amount of public interest in the matter. Also his presidential opponent, Ronald Reagan had made maintaining control over the canal a campaign issue. This put the canal negotiations, already an ongoing problem when Carter took office, onto his “to do” list. Once it became clear that, as Carter’s National Security Advisor Brzezinski said, “a delay in negotiating the treaty invited violence and also endangered [Panamanian President] Torrijos’ position” the issue became Carter’s main focus. More specifically the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told the President that “the canal could not be defended permanently unless [the U.S.] was able to maintain a working partnership and good relations with Panama.” Carter was told that the locks and dams of the canal were very susceptible to sabotage. His Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, stated in his memoirs that he thought “almost all Panamanians regarded exclusive U.S. authority over the zone as an affront to their national sovereignty” and “that sooner or later Panama would resort to major violence, even to the point of destroying the canal.” Torrijos himself was quoted in a New York Times interview in April of 1976 that “serious trouble could erupt in the canal zone if a new treaty [was] not reached by 1977.” The threat of an outbreak of violence in Panama against both American citizens and the canal itself loomed.

Possible violence and loss of the canal was not Carter’s only concern, However. In his own words he was “convinced that we needed to correct an injustice.” Priding himself in his sense of morality he clearly disapproved of the original treaty that made the construction of the canal possible. He highlights the shady circumstances of its passage saying “I was convinced that it was an unfair original agreement, that was foisted upon the Panamanian people against their will.” This quest to do right by Panama also came from a desire to regain American prestige among the international arena. Vance explained Carter’s moral motivation, “Carter did what he thought American values and interests demanded.” The international support for a fair treaty was clear during the signing ceremony on September 7th of 1977. The New York Times reported that the mutual signing by Carter and Torrijos was met with applause by the 26 attending representatives of western hemisphere countries. Of maintaining unilateral control over the canal, Secretary Vance said “the United States would be condemned by world opinion for perpetuating a morally objectionable ‘colonial’ relationship.”

This sense of injustice was certainly not lost on the Panamanians. This presented another reason to settle the negotiations quickly. At risk was the very real possibility that the Panamanian people, angry over stalled negotiations, might replace Torrijos with a leader less willing to negotiate. Thus the negotiations had a time limit. Torrijos himself told Henry Kissinger in 1974 that he considered “the status quo to be more dangerous than any change.” By the time the second and more important treaty was being voted on Torrijos had folded to the widespread pressure in Panama and after the treaty was passed he admitted to Carter that “he had given orders to the National Guard to attack and blow up the canal if the Senate had rejected [the] agreement.” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated that “had we delayed negotiations the Torrijos government might have been replaced by a weaker regime unable to gather support for any treaty that protected our interest.” While widespread desire for a new treaty provided a reason to renegotiate, American support also grew in the U.S. albeit slowly and with much prodding.

Carter’s decision to push for the treaty has been criticized because of the lack of public support for such a move at the time. Critics say that a president should listen to the people rather than pursuing their own personal goals. But by the time the treaty was passed support for it among the American public was considerable. Carter says that when they first set out to gain support for a new treaty “polls indicated that 78 percent of the American people did not want to ‘give up’ the canal, and only 8 percent found the idea acceptable.” However by February of 1978 a new poll showed 45 percent in favor and 42 percent opposed. This was due to the administration’s efforts to counter the opposition’s public campaign against the treaties. Once the public was made aware of the specifics of the proposed agreements more and more people came over to Carter’s side. The New York times reported on poll results from April of 1978 in which surveyors reminded participants regarding the added amendments guaranteeing the ability of the United States to defend the canal. According to their findings, “51 percent of those questioned approved of the treaties.”

So we see that Carter did have the necessary amount of public support because once they actually learned about the specifics about the treaty they came to support it. The President was certainly justified in his pursuit. The threat of a closed or damaged canal, the need to display a commitment to democracy abroad, and the justified belief that the U.S. had wrongly duped the Panamanians in 1903 combined to make a renegotiated treaty not just desirable but necessary. Carter himself credits the endeavor to right the canal situation with his 1980 election defeat. But he also firmly believes that it was worth it And rightly so.